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 Abstract
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion dollar 
infrastructure investment project, is heralded as a game changer for 
Pakistan’s economy and for regional cooperation more generally(1). As 
a crucial part of the major development initiative led by China, known 
as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), to connect Asia with Europe, the 
Middle East and Africa, the CPEC is widely linked to hopes, interests, 
as well as regional and global geopolitics. However, such a mega-
project also raises numerous questions, especially with regards to the 
feasibility of its implementation, the impact on the region and, India’s 
stance vis-a-vis the endeavour. Therefore, this Research Paper seeks to 
shed light on involved interests and challenges, potential impact on 
regional development and makes special reference of India’s role in it. 
South Asia Democratic 
Forum (SADF)
19 Avenue des Arts
1210 Brussels
Belgium
info@sadf.eu
www.sadf.eu
+12 026 834 180
+32 2 808 42 08
Reg. Num. BE 
833606320 
Keywords: CPEC, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; CPEC; Economic Corridors; 
Regional Cooperation; Pakistan-China Relations; Foreign Policy Pakistan
WORKING 
PAPER
SADF WORKING 
PAPER 
28/06/2016 No. 1 
ISSN 2506-8199 SADF
Siegfried O.Wolf 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: 
An Assessment of its Feasibility and Impact on 
Regional Cooperation
1. Daily Capital, 2.10.2015; Fazil, 15.2.2016; Khan, 13.6.2015; Sahgal, 24.4.2015.
!
!
 
 
!
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Index 
 
 
Introduction 
Conceptualising Economic Corridors 
The overarching idea of the CPEC - China’s ‘One Belt and One Road’ initiative 
Initial conditions: Pakistan-China relations  
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – The Implementation 
Interests: Expected benefits from the Economic Corridor for China and Pakistan 
Pakistani interests 
Chinese interests 
Challenges 
The CPEC and India: Challenge or Opportunity? 
Feasibility of the project: Will the CPEC fulfil its function as an Economic Corridor? 
Final Thoughts - Impact of CPEC on Regionalisation 
Bibliography 
 
 !
!
!
 
 
!
3 
 
Introduction 
Regionalism in South Asia has focused on collective efforts to overcome mostly weak, 
congeneric economies, political fragmentation, socio-religious cleavages and the deep-rooted 
conflicts that exist among its member states and societies. To enhance regional cooperation, 
the idea of an Economic Corridor (EC) is finding its way into foreign policy strategies as it 
becomes a buzzword in plans for stimulating economic growth and deepening integration of 
Asia’s sub-regions.2 This idea has taken root early on in South East Asia, spearheaded by the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) initiative in 1992. In South Asia, prominence of economic 
corridors is a more recent phenomenon, currently the most advanced example is that of the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).3  
Against this backdrop, this research report will focus on following questions: Firstly, will the 
CPEC have an impact on the integration of the politically and economically disadvantaged 
provinces such as Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA)? Secondly, can we expect CPEC to serve as a pioneer project for further 
regional economic cooperation and integration beyond the Pakistan-China nexus? In other 
words, will this bilateral endeavour be an impetus or rather another hindrance for current 
regional cooperation? Thirdly, what are the perceptions, expectations, interests, and 
challenges regarding CPEC in the larger context of China’s major development strategy of 
‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) on both the provincial and central level in Pakistan? Who are 
the driving forces behind the CPEC? Fourthly, what might be the positive or negative social, 
economic and political impact of government’s Pakistan’s current policy approach to CPEC? 
Fifthly, will CPEC live up to its ambitious aim as an economic corridor or will it not move 
beyond the stage of a transportation corridor for Chinese and Pakistani goods and people? 
Will CPEC be able to fulfil all functions of an economic corridor?  
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Conceptualising Economic Corridors 
The focus on economic corridors has become a trend of strategic development in various 
countries and regions worldwide.4 Basically, one can state that an economic corridor is a 
project of economic development targeted at increasing economic growth over a certain 
period of time and in a specific area. 5  Nevertheless, despite the increasing scholarly 
engagement, there is no agreed upon definition. Rather, one could describe its nature as an 
emerging but fluid concept, embedded6 in shared characteristics that provide a common 
ground. 
Subsequently, from a conceptual point of view, ECs link economic agents along a defined 
geographical entity and provide important connections among economic nodes or hubs 
(usually) centered in urban landscapes7.8 More concretely, ECs link production, trade and 
infrastructure within a specific geographic framework of the centre of economic activities and 
extend benefits to rural areas through transport development and expansion of production 
activities.9 As such, a corridor is designed to create global, regional and domestic value 
chains, connect economic nodes and (ideally) has a positive multi-sectoral spillover effect. In 
order to achieve this a corridor must move beyond simply serving as a ‘passage for the transit 
of goods and commodities (and people?)’. It must function as an ‘industrial corridor’ and 
“develop a sound industrial base, served by competitive infrastructure as a prerequisite for 
attracting investments into export oriented industries and manufacturing”.10 
Keeping all this in mind, in order to realise its full potential an economic corridor requires 
economic-, organisational,- institutional-, behavioural-, political- and planning aspects:  
First of all, one must conceptualise a growth zone/region/sub-region based on cultural, 
historical, ecological and economic commonalities.  
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5 
Secondly, one must conduct a survey to identify economic nodes or industrial centres or 
clusters of the region. Ideally, the identified locations encompass a “large amount of 
economic resources and actors”.11 
Thirdly, these centres and clusters must be linked through various connectivity projects and 
production chains.12 This connectivity between the nodes in the corridor is crucial, without 
strong functional links no significant economic movement and interaction between the nodes 
will/can take place.13 This also implies the existence of an efficient feeder system to improve 
the connectivity, like an integrated train, tram, metro, and bus system and a system to 
facilitate pedestrian movement.14 
Fourthly, an economic corridor must be endowed with “an enabling industry, one that is able 
to meet goals inherent to transport as well as other pressing national and social objectives”.15 
These objectives include “economic growth, creating a high and rising standard of living for 
all citizens, increased trade, especially with neighbouring countries; improved access to 
employment opportunities; and increased social integration”.16 In this context, it is most 
important that an economic corridor does not merely function as a transit corridor for goods 
and commodities, especially not predominantly for the donor country(ies). Such a ‘container 
in – container out economy’ stands in stark contrast to the idea of economic corridors as 
development enhancing factor. In order to avoid such a trajectory, the successful 
establishment of full-fledged Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and industrial parks are of great 
importance. 
Fifthly, there must be a pre-existence of economic viability.17 More concretely, the area in 
which a corridor is to be developed must (1) show pre-existent strong economic growth, (2) 
show a natural propensity and strong effective demand for further mixed-use development 
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and (3) be free of inhibitors.18 Simply put, this means that the development of a corridor in the 
region must make ‘economic sense’, if they are not economically feasible and do not offer 
investors a ‘satisfactory cash return’ on their investment - especially if weighed against an 
array of opportunities - they will not become a reality19 
Sixthly, all actors involved must possess the political will to implement the necessary 
measures. Decision makers on all levels of government and sector representatives need to be 
fully committed to the corridor-project. This requires a co-operative, constructive mindset 
among all major players, without it, a successful and comprehensive implementation of the 
corridor remains unlikely.20 
Seventhly, the economic corridor development must be based on an integrated and 
comprehensive planning. In other words, there needs to be a co-operative and overarching 
direction to oversee and execute the corridor vision, the respective plan, the planning process, 
and the implementation of the plan. In order to devise and administer such a centralised 
approach, all relevant socio-economic and socio-political realities have to be taken into 
account. 21  Additionally, actions by governmental- (like sectoral agencies/departments 
responsible for land use policy and management, transportation planning and infrastructure 
investment and maintenance, security sector agents among others) and non-governmental 
actors are imperative to ensure all the realisation of the corridor-vision.22 Any actions that run 
counter to the vision will need to be adequately addressed.  
Against this backdrop, there must be an independent body able to manage and ensure 
comprehensive implementation and regulation.23 Anybody responsible for the planning and 
the implementation of the corridor and respective projects needs the necessary capacity and 
mandate to function properly24 and will likely require an institutional transformation25 in all 
levels of government. In addition to the establishment of effective planning bodies, the 
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corridor would also greatly benefit from the reduction of excessive regulations, rigid 
conformity to formal rules and regulations and, other bureaucratic hindrances imposing on the 
decision-making- and implementation processes. In brief, it is rather senseless to prepare 
corridor plans without enforcing or implementing them, or hamper their plans because of 
unnecessary red tape.26 
Eighthly, the corridor proposal must include a concrete action plan with a complementary 
time-frame. The action plan should outline exactly when key investments (like energy, 
infrastructure among others) in the corridor will be made to ensure private sector trust and 
involvement.27 
Ninthly, the success of a corridor development depends significantly on geographic stability 
and security. Without guarantees to the security, stability and planning reliability in the 
medium to longer term, potential investors will be hesitant to make any investments at all.28 
In this context, one should also note that the success of an economic corridor depends greatly 
on a favourable, positive image and perception among the broader public, the media and 
potential investors of both a corridor and the wider area in which it is located.29 
Last but not least, economic corridors must have an inclusive and comprehensive character, it 
is not enough that economic corridors are integral to the economic fabric and the economic 
actors surrounding it. If this were to be the case, economic corridors would generate limited 
economic benefits as they remain isolated (understood as a narrow, exclusive area of 
operation). In order to achieve maximum benefits, economic corridors must pervade into 
larger economic networks, such as global and regional value chains and production 
networks.30 
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The overarching idea of the CPEC - China’s ‘One Belt and One Road’ initiative 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) represents a significant part of a bigger 
regional initiative led by China, known as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) or New Silk Road 
Economic Development Corridor.31 Basically, the OBOR plan aims to revive ancient trade 
routes connecting Asia with Europe and Africa, a vision that was announced by the Chinese 
President Xi Jinping in 2013. Since then, Xi’s notion is making headway and is proving to be 
a major focus of Chinese diplomacy. Led by Beijing, the OBOR concept refers to two 
ambitious development proposals: the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt (CMSR).32 The SREB is a vision to revive the ancient 
Silk Road that once connected China with Europe via high speed railroads, highways, energy- 
and distribution networks, as well as fibre optic networks.33 The Silk Road Economic Belt 
(SREB) consists of three separate corridors: Firstly, the Northern Corridor to Moscow and 
Germany that starts from Beijing, passes through Russia, and links it to European cities.34 
Secondly, the Central Corridor to Europe via Iran that starts in Shanghai and links the 
country to Tashkent, Tehran and onwards to the Bandar Imam Khomeini Port of Iran by the 
Persian Gulf. One of this Iranian port branches also stretches up towards Europe. This last 
route is the longest one and could provide an alternative in case the CPEC is not implemented 
in time by Pakistan; or CPEC appears unachievable because of security risks35 and/or lack of 
management capacity. Lastly, the Southern Corridor begins from Guangzhou, the third 
largest city of the People’s Republic in South Central China. This trail moves towards western 
parts of the country (Xinjiang province) and connects the city of Kashgar with Pakistan at 
Kunjarab pass. From this mountain saddle at the northern border of Pakistan's Gilgit–Baltistan 
Hunza - Nagar District, China looks to link its Southern Corridor to Gwadar port, a gateway 
to the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.36 This (southward orientated) extension of 
the Southern Corridor will be implemented through the CPEC. 
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The CMSR - a sea based path through the South China Sea, South Pacific Ocean and Indian 
Ocean - complements the SREB. It is the modern-day equivalent of old sea lanes and aims to 
link China with the Mediterranean Sea via the Persian Gulf.37 
Both projects (SREB and CMSR) mark the completion of two fundamental phases in China's 
economic development: the ‘bringing-in’ (or hitching a ride) period with the ‘bringing out’ 
phase. During the first period, Beijing was primarily opening up to receive international 
assistance, foreign investment and technology; during the second phase, China pushed its 
enterprises and companies to get engaged outside the country and to “Go Global”. Ever since 
the “Go Global” policy was launched in 2001, various economic reforms have been 
introduced, like the relaxation of foreign exchange controls, investment restrictions and 
approval procedures.38 In 2003, Beijing allowed privately held companies to apply for 
permission to invest internationally.39 Now, with the OBOR, the Peoples Republic is entering 
a new phase of domestic economic development and international cooperation by combining 
and extending the original two development strategies of ‘bringing in’ and ‘bringing out’. 
Another innovation is the introduction of the new concept of ‘mutual benefit’. In this context, 
Beijing’s development strategy is aiming for win-win cooperation with partners and 
neighbouring countries, ensuring they are also benefitting from China’s economic growth to 
assure their ‘mutual and equal pace of development’.40 In order to make the OBOR work, 
Beijing is funding the bulk of New Silk Road Projects. Chinese analysts are careful to 
emphasise that this sponsoring policy is guided by the concept of the ‘Three No’s’: China will 
not interfere in the internal affairs of other nations; China does not seek to increase its so 
called ‘sphere of influence’; and, China does not strive for hegemony or dominance.41 
Compared to other projects, China has signalled that CPEC is a priority because it provides 
China with a direct connection (the shortest possible land route) to the Strait of Hormuz and 
the Arabian Sea.42 As such, the CPEC is a ‘flagship project’ and is essential insofar it 
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provides a link between the overland SREB and the CMSR.43 Originally, the idea of a 
corridor was proposed by Premier Li Keqiang during a visit to Pakistan in May 2013. 
However, it really started to pick up steam in the months thereafter as Beijing unveiled its 
ambitious plans for an inter-continental Silk Road. Shortly thereafter, China and Pakistan 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on 
July 5, 2013 during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to China.44 However, the most 
important step towards the actualisation of the CPEC project was the April 2015 visit of 
Chinese President Xi Jinping to Pakistan; during this visit he announced a $46 billion 
commitment for the implementation of this multi-faceted network. 45  This far-reaching 
financial promise was accompanied by 51 agreements (MoUs) for projects totalling $28 
billion.46 Despite several bouts of criticism and concern with regards to Pakistan’s ability to 
implement such a mega-development measure, construction works have started and several 
projects are currently underway.47 
 
Initial conditions: Pakistan-China relations  
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have long 
enjoyed strong and friendly ties, especially since Pakistan was the first Muslim country and 
the third non-communist state to recognise the PRC in 1950.48 Furthermore, Pakistan was the 
first country to establish official ties with China and since then, it continues to provide China 
with diplomatic assistance on important issues. This includes support for China’s seat in the 
UN in 1961, backing of Beijing’s “One-China Policy”49, as well as support in the aftermath of 
the bloody crackdown by the government during the Tiananmen protests in 1989 (June 
Fourth incident) in which thousands of the ‘pro-democracy’, ‘pro-reform movement’50 lost 
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their lives or got injured. Another example of Islamabad’s remarkable support for Beijing was 
its role facilitating the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s.51 As a result, 
Pakistan is remarkably self-confident when it comes to its ties with China and points out that 
it “played a pioneering role in introducing the reality of China to the contemporary world”52.  
 
China emphasises these close ties on any and all official occasions and refer to the 
relationship as ‘all-weather friends’ who are sharing a relationship which is “is higher than 
mountains, deeper than oceans, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel”.53 Despite this 
flowery rhetoric, China and Pakistan do not have much in common.54 Their mutual interest 
are limited to a shared (albeit weakening Chinese) antagonism towards India and a shared 
border of more than 520 kilometres.55 One has to be aware that, in many ways, Sino-Pakistan 
ties do not reflect a relationship of equal partners.  
 
Since both countries signed a Free Trade Agreement in 2006, China has become Pakistan’s 
largest trading partner.56 However, the volume of trade with Pakistan “is a drop in the bucket 
for Beijing”.57 Furthermore, Pakistan and China “have never been treaty allies, do not share 
any cultural reference points or values, and their militaries come from radically different 
traditions”.58 In this context it is interesting to mention that while Pakistanis view China in an 
overwhelmingly positive light, it seems that most Chinese either look down on their South 
Asian neighbours or at least share a far less enthusiastic attitude towards Pakistanis.59 The fact 
that some Chinese believe Pakistan is a violent, lawless, chaotic, and poorly governed, run-
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down place partly explains this discrepancy.60 Nevertheless, most Chinese acknowledge the 
close ties between the countries and despite ideological differences and differing perceptions 
among its respective populations, the cooperation between China and Pakistan has continued 
to grow in decades’ past.  
 
Today, Beijing is Pakistan’s top supplier for military hardware and nuclear technology.61 
Furthermore, the two neighbours are more deeply engaged providing aid to each-other in the 
wake of natural disasters.62 Nevertheless, in recent years, China has adopted a more critical 
stance towards Pakistan, stressing the need for more security in South Asia,63 especially with 
regards to domestic and cross border terrorism64, and urges the Pakistan government to make 
peace in Afghanistan a top priority on its foreign policy agenda65. Having said this, it is clear 
that China is not satisfied with Pakistan’s current counterterrorism capabilities and the way in 
which it handles Chinese Uighur militants operating from its soil.66 Beijing also expresses 
indignation regarding Islamabad’s failure to prioritise stability in Afghanistan rather than 
focusing its efforts keeping India out of Afghanistan and establishing a pro-Pakistani 
government in Kabul.67 Nevertheless, one can state that despite disagreement on these 
political issues, the economic and military cooperation has persistently grown in recent 
decades.  
 
In sum, while major Chinese investments in Pakistan are nothing new it has taken some time 
to find a project to enhance economic ties and ensure lasting cooperation.68 In this context, 
China’s move to open-up its western province to trade and investment from Pakistan by 
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supporting the construction of the Karakorum Highway (KKH)69 was a significant step 
towards closer economic cooperation between both countries. In other words, the construction 
of the KKH helped not only to overcome one of the greatest physical barriers to the corridor 
(the highly glaciated mountainous range of the Karakoram), it also created useful 
collaborative experiences that can serve as catalysts for future and ongoing joint enterprises.70 
Therefore, the subsequent decisions to modernise the KKH and build the 1,240 km Karachi-
Lahore motorway71 (among many other projects) are major contributing factors that help 
bring the new CPEC to life. In sum, CPEC is not starting from scratch. 
 
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – The Implementation 
As indicated above, the CPEC must be understood as a crucial part of the China’s OBOR 
initiative and its aims to establish the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road 
through Pakistani port facilities. Praised as a new economic lifeline, the CPEC is the essential 
link between the belt and road. In order to provide this connection, the CPEC should connect 
Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region with Gwadar port on the 
Balochistan coast in Pakistan’s south-western region.72 According to the plan, the CPEC will 
be implemented through a ‘1+4’ cooperation structure73: the Economic Corridor at the centre 
and Gwadar port, energy, infrastructure and industrialisation as its four key areas of 
collaboration. In order to operationalise this endeavour, the corridor combines several cross-
sectional components such as infrastructure, trade, connectivity, transport, energy and 
services. More concretely, it consists of different infrastructure measures. First and foremost: 
roads, railways and pipelines for oil & gas. For example, the upgrade and expansion of 
Gwadar port includes the construction of an international airport and a hospital. In this 
context, in addition to building completely new supporting infrastructure to create 
connectivity, several major upgrades of existing outdated infrastructure systems are required. 
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Besides infrastructure, the major focus will be on the increase of energy capacities, including 
renewable and non-renewable such as solar-, wind-, hydropower energy (dams) and coal. The 
planned pipeline projects are also expected to improve the imports of gas and oil. 
Additionally, all the projects are flanked by substantial security measures to guarantee a 
secure environment for the CPEC development.74  
 
Essentially, the CPEC encompasses three routes through Pakistan, plus a northern extension: 
First, the so called Eastern Alignment: This route mainly passes through central Punjab and 
Sindh, connecting the cities Thakot-Mansehra-Islamabad-Lahore and Multan. From Multan, 
the trail will link up at Hyderabad through Rohri and Dadu. The Hyderabad-Karachi part will 
be linked through the M-9 super highway and finally Karachi will then be linked to Gwadar 
on the Arabian Sea through N-10 Coastal East Bay Express Highway along the coastline.75 
Second, the Central Route passes partly through Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and hitherto 
unconnected parts of Punjab and Sindh. The third route - the Western Alignment - passes 
through the relatively underdeveloped areas of KPK and Balochistan.76 This route will most 
likely run through Dera Ismail Khan and Fort Sandeman- or Dera Ghazi Khan and Zhob to 
Quetta and onward to the Makran coast in order to connect with Gwadar.77 Finally there is the 
so called Northern route, which will connect all the three Pakistani alignments with the 
Pakistani-China border at Kunjarab and continues on Chinese territory. 
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Interests: Expected benefits from the Economic Corridor for China and Pakistan 
A multi-faceted development project like the CPEC influences many aspects of state and 
society, it relates to the economic, political, and social spheres as well as foreign policy 
objectives and geopolitics. 
 
Pakistani interests 
From an economic point of view, Pakistan’s main interest is to attract foreign capital. In other 
words, the CPEC comes at a time when a surge of major investments in the country is 
imperative.78 Through the successful implementation of the respective projects Islamabad 
hopes to improve the infrastructure and energy situation and to generate a positive spill-over 
effect in all other economic sectors. In this context, through the build-up of special economic 
zones, the CPEC aims to be a transit route for commodities and raw materials but also to 
become a catalyst for industrialisation and spur the development of manufacturing hubs. 
These hubs must boost Pakistan's underperforming economy and create opportunities for 
entrepreneurs. By identifying economics nodes in established industrialised-urban centres as 
well as disadvantaged rural areas, the government hopes to generate a nationwide economic 
boost that reaches Pakistan’s poorer provinces.79 In order to reach these goals Pakistan will 
link of country’s major cities to serve as junctions in a new nation-wide infrastructure. 
Islamabad hopes that this addresses the problems of unemployment, lack of knowhow, and 
lacking trade capabilities. Keeping these goals in mind, CPEC might also initiate an impetus 
to reverse negative processes of brain drain and capital flight that are reaching alarmingly 
high levels at the moment.80  
 
If the projects proves successful, CPEC could have a positive impact on the population's 
overall mind set: On the one hand attracting educated youths abroad as well as getting those 
who were planning to leave the country (re-)engaged in Pakistan's future. On the other hand it 
could convince non-state investors to provide venture capital. In the context of Pakistan’s 
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overall financial indicators, one is hopeful that foreign exchange reserves will significantly 
increase as CPEC progresses. Needless to say that Islamabad wishes to further deepen 
Pakistani and Chinese cooperation as the Chinese are finally willing to broaden bilateral ties 
beyond geopolitics and towards mutually entrenched economic- and socio-political relations. 
Or in the words of Ahsan Iqbal, Pakistan's minister for planning and development, who 
believes that the CPEC will change the scope of Sino-Pakistan ties: “from geopolitics to geo-
economics” which will have "significant transformative effect on Pakistan's economy”.81 As 
the CPEC is implemented, “the entire geo-strategic importance of Pakistan will change.”82  
 
The increase in trade and transit activities will not only increase Pakistan’s revenues but also 
intensify people-to-people contact and cultural exchange. Importantly, it will also diversify 
Pakistan's foreign aid- and investment portfolio. Traditionally, US financial support was a 
major source for inflow of financial assets, however, provision of capital by the US (and 
Europeans) is usually linked to political conditions or prerequisites. After the cool-down in 
US-Pakistan relations, Washington reduced its engagement in the region and left Islamabad 
looking to replace ‘unreliable’ US support. However, the CPEC investments by China do 
more than simply filling this void, Pakistan’s decision makers are convinced that China is not 
just an ‘all-weather friend’, but also a valuable ally that will transform into a political and 
economic superpower within the next decade. Therefore, Islamabad will further strengthen its 
relationship with Beijing at the expense on its ties with the US. Taking into account the 
different perspectives of Washington and Beijing on issues such as the South China Sea, 
Taiwan, China’s approach to counter-terrorism, and the repatriation of Uighurs militants 
seeking (mostly illegal) shelter outside China, one can also see a broader alignment of 
Pakistani and Chinese views than exists between Pakistan and the US. 
 
There is no doubt that the above mentioned economic opportunities will have significant 
political and social impact. One may expect: Firstly, improving relations between different 
provinces as well as better centre-state relations. Secondly, the notion that a successful 
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(complete) implementation of the CPEC will improve the credibility and capacities of the 
(civilian) government and as such strengthen processes of (good) governance. Thirdly, all this 
could potentially lead to a new international status and improved regional standing83 for 
Pakistan based on the emergence of a “new economic self-confidence”. With this in mind, 
Islamabad’s decision-makers aim to overcome the country’s regional ‘diplomatic isolation’84 
and to subsequently improve the economic and political cooperation with Afghanistan, Iran, 
Central Asian States and Russia.85 Finally, extraordinary growth predictions will generate 
positive results for the common people. In this context, there is great hope that the subsequent 
improvement of the living conditions will also help contain political radicalization, 
Islamisation, militancy, and jihadism. In brief, the CPEC might help to eradicate terrorism in 
Pakistan.86 
 
Chinese interests 
According to analysts, China has plenty of incentive to unleash these vast investments, 
despite facing a multitude of threats that challenge the establishment and smooth functioning 
of the CPEC.87  
Beijing is convinced that in the light of its many security problems, Pakistan is in need of 
major development projects to bring stability to the country.88 From Beijing’s point of view, 
this will protect Chinese economic interests and reduce the terrorist threat coming from 
Pakistan. It believes that sustainable economic prosperity in Pakistan will help to contain the 
terrorism that challenges Chinese economic interests, territory and security. In other words, it 
aims secure a win-win situation by eradicating the threat within Pakistan and protect its 
economic interests in the country.89  As reported by Andrew Small: "Chinese investments 
have been constrained by Pakistan's instability and security threats to Chinese workers. By 
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some measures, “Pakistan has been the most dangerous place to be an overseas Chinese”.90 
Therefore, China demands a clear commitment from Pakistan accompanied by clear and 
concrete actions to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic 
and Chinese citizens on Pakistani soil. Namely, to undermine all efforts from Pakistan based 
terrorists and separatists to destabilize ‘mainland China’, especially Xinjiang province.91 
Furthermore, Beijing expects that Pakistan continues its diplomatic support for the ‘One-
China policy’.92 
 
Additionally, the land-based CPEC provides China with another access route to the Indian 
Ocean and allows it to by-pass the Malacca straits to reach Africa and the Middle East93.94 
Strategists have long perceived the corridor as a strategic liability; they look to insulate China 
from a potential blockade.95 The current increasing tensions in the South China Sea are an 
indicator for the likelihood of such a scenario. This so called ‘Malacca-Dilemma’ further 
gains significance if one takes into account that around 80 percent of Chinese energy imports 
flow through the Malacca route.96 While CPEC is expected to be shorter, cheaper and avoid 
the risk of piracy97, it is doubtful that any land corridor could fully substitute the economic 
purpose of the Malacca Strait. Nevertheless, it would significantly reduce Beijing’s reliance 
on the Malacca passage. 
 
Another reason why an improved connection with the Middle East and Africa is gaining 
significance is the presence of thousands of Chinese firms, employing tens of thousands of 
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Chinese workers involved in entrepreneurial and development activities in the region.98 As 
such, the CPEC also touches on China’s overseas organisations and entities and would 
provide additional logistic support and coordination to Chinese business activities abroad.99 
 
China hopes that the CPEC can also provide a boost to China's slacking economy, especially 
in the western, landlocked province of Xinjiang.100 The project should help bridge the 
development imbalance between the prosperous eastern and underdeveloped western parts of 
the country.101 The corridor should create incentives for both state- and private enterprises to 
expand economic activity, create jobs, and raise consumption levels in this under-developed 
region.102 By doing this China similarly expects to stabilise the region by improving the 
economic conditions in the western periphery, the region currently constitutes one of 
Beijing’s top domestic security concerns.103 However, Uighur militants, who are leading a 
separatist movement in Xinjiang, might perceive its development as a way to exploit the  
region's resources. Overall, China expects that improving economic conditions in Xinjiang 
will bring socio-politically stability and subsequently help undermine the ‘three evils’: 
Separatism, terrorism and religious fundamentalism.104  
 
 
Challenges 
While the project clearly raises expectations for opportunities and progress, in order to 
implement the CPEC successfully, Pakistan faces severe challenges and problems related to 
the patterns of Pakistan’s traditional realpolitik.  
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First of all, Pakistan has a troubling record of ruining major development projects105 with 
internal political bickering, and there’s a fear that CPEC may meet the same fate.106 Due to 
Pakistan’s provincial rivalries, struggles between political parties as well as centre-region 
conflict there is a lack of consensus and harmony among the key players involved in the 
project. Mega-projects like CPEC all too frequently run aground, either they fall prey to a 
lack of vision, or they stall on political tussles and lack of political will to share power with 
the regions and grant ownership to local people.107 
 
One of the most critical policy-related issues is the concrete route of the corridor. One of the 
major concerns of the architects of the CPEC is the deeply entrenched tensions between the 
different provinces, especially Balochistan, KPK (including FATA108) and Punjab, as well as 
the tensions between the central government and the provinces/regions.109 Partly due to these 
conflicts, one of the largest disputes pertains to whether the route passes through X or Y. For 
the longest time it seemed “the only points of agreement are that it should go from Kashgar to 
Gwadar”.110 However, there are claims that the original route was supposed to go mostly 
through western Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa/FATA (Western alignment/route), and 
to a must lesser extent Gilgit-Baltistan and Punjab (Eastern alignment/route). While the 
government of Pakistan has denied any changes to the route, voices from within Balochistan, 
KPK and FATA allege that the Punjab dominated ‘establishment’111 in Islamabad replaced 
the original ‘Western alignment’ with an ‘Eastern oriented alignment’.112  
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Following Chinese pressure to depoliticise the project113, in an attempt to calm down the 
heated debate, Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif conducted an All-Party Conference 
(APC)114 on 28th May 2015 to clarify issues with regards to the CPEC route.115 At this APC, a 
‘national consensus’ emerged to develop the western route first and for the project to include 
all provinces, which was subsequently announced by Prime Minister Sharif. In return, all 
political parties pledged full commitment to the CPEC.116 It is interesting to note here, that 
Islamabad appears quite keen “to send a good message to China that the entire Pakistani 
nation is committed to the economic corridor project”.117 Despite these announcements 
critics remain sceptical. In sum, if there is no satisfactory solution taking all the provinces’ 
interests into account, the project runs the risk of falling victim to provincial rivalries, 
competition between the different political parties, and tense centre-province relations.118  
 
Furthermore, there is a lack of transparency119 and communication between Islamabad and the 
provinces, adding to an atmosphere of secrecy and confusion surrounding the CPEC 
project.120 For one, the decision-making process needs to be clarified, especially considering 
the fact that provinces are not adequately included. Subsequently the smaller provinces are 
wondering how they can benefit from the CPEC, if at all.121 In this context, one should be 
aware that neither Pakistan nor China have any remarkable record of promoting 
transparency122 and accountability. In result, China faces the same problems as the U.S. and 
other foreign investors, namely corruption and incompetence.123  
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Secondly, the overall lack of security is worrisome. Among many others124, there are two 
major challenges towards implementing the CPEC: The unrest in Balochistan province and 
domestic as well as global Islamist militancy. The ongoing insurgency in the Balochistan 
province makes up the most crucial challenge for a successful implementation of the CPEC 
project as Gwadar port is instrumental to its success.125 In this context, it is important to note 
that the Baloch people's relationship with the central government has been strained from the 
get-go. 126  Feeling militarily oppressed, economically exploited, socially and politically 
marginalized, the Baloch people have been involved in several armed uprisings against 
Islamabad.127 One of the major points of contention is that despite being rich in energy and 
mineral resources,128 as well as strategically well placed, Balochistan remains the country’s 
least developed and least industrialised region with the lowest level of literacy and income. 
More than half of the population continues to live below the poverty line.129 Baloch 
insurgents consider the CPEC a foreign occupation of their homeland and an attempt to 
further marginalize the native Baloch people in the name of economic development.130 
Furthermore, the Economic Corridor is seen as Punjabi expansionism and a strategy by the 
central government to strengthen its grip on Baloch's resources. As such, concerns that the 
project will only benefit Islamabad and serve Chinese interests, with little to offer the Baloch 
in return, are rising.131 
Besides the problems stemming from the Baloch insurgency, there is also a fear that Pakistani 
based Islamic terrorists might use the upcoming opportunities of the CPEC to carry out 
attacks that damage the country’s economy but also intensify their attacks on Chinese 
development projects, companies, and workers on Pakistan’s soil. Terrorists targeting Chinese 
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projects are an additional security threats within Pakistan as they have the potential to 
destabilize China’s Xinjiang province.132  
The Pakistan Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan/TTP) are another major cause for concern. 
Although the TTP have yet to specifically threaten the CPEC, they are identifying and 
tageting important government and military installations that could inflict economic loss on 
the country.133  
 
Uighur militants from the western Chinese Xinjiang province, mainly organized in the East 
Turkestan Islamic Movement/ETIM and affiliated with the TTP, make up an additional 
security threat.134 The Eastern-Turkic speaking Uighur militants that feel closer to Central 
Asian States (CAS) are favouring separation from China135 and wish to form their own state, 
described as ‘East Turkistan (Republic)’.136 Many of the Uighur fighters are organized in an 
umbrella group, called East Turkestan Islamic Movement or ETIM137. In 2002 ETIM was 
listed as one of the ‘more extreme separatist groups’ and as a terrorist organization by the 
US.138 Also, more and more Uighur militants intermingle with international Jihadist networks 
such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) to reach their goal of separation of Xinjiang from 
China. 139 Besides serving al-Qaeda and Islamic State as fighters in various countries, ETIM's 
main focus remains planning attacks in- and outside China, specifically against Chinese 
people and projects in the Af-Pak region.140 Over the last years, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State have increasingly employed aspirations of ‘East Turkistan’ to justify global Jihad. In 
this context it is important to note that that al-Qaeda joined the Islamic state, an organisation 
that declared Jihad against China and openly condemned Beijing for its (alleged) 
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mistreatment of its Uighur Muslim population.141 Both organisations hail the fight against the 
Chinese as their “Islamic responsibility” describing them as “enemy of all Muslims”142. 
Subsequently, a mega-project like CPEC might very well attract unwanted attention from 
Pakistan based terrorists and Uighur militants but also from global jihadist networks, such as 
al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. 
 
At this time it seems that there are some improvements in the security situation especially in 
“high risk areas” such as restive areas of Balochistan.143 However, to ensure a smooth 
functioning of the CPEC, Pakistan needs a permanent state of security and rule of law. 
Reviewing the unfortunate record of the country’s security forces in dealing with the sources 
of instability compared with the grow and resilience of anti-state actors, one questions 
whether the Pakistani government is able to provide an appropriate security environment for 
an effective functioning Economic Corridor. In this context it is relevant to review the 
happenings in the wake of the Zarb-e-Azb military operation.144 As the army reduces its 
engagement and shifts responsibility back to civilian law enforcement agencies (which should 
be the norm, not the exception) the number of terrorist attacks might increase once more. 
 
Thirdly, the project has to deal with severe geographical obstacles and natural calamities that 
especially affects CPECs its northern route (Karakorum Highway/KKH)145. 
Despite the fact that the government managed to address several significant geographical 
obstacles146 in the mountainous areas of northern Pakistan, some others remain unaddressed. 
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First and foremost, the Khunjerab Pass remains closed from November to May due to heavy 
snow;147 these extreme weather conditions also bring with them an array of technical 
difficulties for transportation companies which prove to be especially problematic for 
Pakistani trucks running on older (diesel) engines. These old trucks would not be able to 
operate optimally in such a high mountainous area; therefore, they have to offload around 30 
percent of their cargo.148 Furthermore, there is the persistent threat of natural calamities like 
quakes and slides making the KKH impassable. In sum, analysts wonder if an upgrade of 
certain roads might help solve these difficulties implementing the KKH.149 
 
Fourthly, CPEC implementation struggles with a lack of time and insufficient managing 
capacities by Pakistani authorities. This brings into focus one of the most important questions: 
how realistic is the implementation of such a mega-project in an underdeveloped, politically 
unstable country with an extraordinary weak institutional, political-administrative 
infrastructure. Furthermore, endemic corruption, lack in planning and management, such as 
problems of land acquisition and slow progress on numerous projects have already 
tremendously increased the costs.150 Pakistani authorities already admitted that some projects 
envisioned by China and Pakistan in 2010 might not reach completion. “If that turns out to be 
the case, they admit it will mostly have been due to incompetence, corruption and lack of 
transparency”151. Subsequently, many observers are stating that the Chinese investments “are 
being distributed inefficiently”.152 While ongoing energy shortages153 and inefficient planning 
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will not render the implementation of the CPEC impossible, they continue to hamper its 
progress and add to the costs of individual projects. In this context it is helpful to lay out the 
reasons for the continuing energy shortages. While there is undoubtedly an urgent need for 
energy supply and production, energy shortages persist due to disastrous payment practices, 
behaviour and morale. If these issues do not change, even with a significant increase in 
energy production, the problems of energy shortages will be not solved in the long run. As a 
result, many of the on-going CPEC projects face delays and extra costs, which provokes 
additional domestic criticism. Herein lies the main crux of the matter: China wants to 
implement the CPEC as soon as possible but they also need it to be supported by a national 
consensus. At the moment it seems that Beijing is not only concerned about the security of its 
investments and workers but also regarding the disharmony among the provinces and 
persisting centre-region tensions. The fact that Pakistan focusses mainly on infrastructure and 
energy projects as it neglects the build-up of industrial centers does not please China either. 
As such, Pakistan faces the imminent threat that China will start to consider alternatives, for 
example a potential Iran-China Corridor.154 
 
Fifthly, another major challenge for Pakistan development problem is the inefficient use of 
existing infrastructure. The country has a record neglecting the potential of land-based routes 
with all its neighbours but especially with China. Unsurprisingly, land based trade between 
Pakistan and China represents only a small a fraction of bilateral trade. This problem persists 
despite a 1993 “international road transport agreement” which finally became operational in 
2006.155 “Similarly, while Pakistan has transit, transport, and communication with a host of 
regional countries, its trade with them still remains minuscule”156. In sum, overall application 
of the existing mechanism for intra-regional trade is clearly lacking. 
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Finally, there are several administrative procedures hampering the effectiveness of trade and 
economic cooperation between China and Pakistan. Especially in the context of land-based 
transport of goods and passengers, and general movement of people: Delays issuing visas for 
transporters, high quarantine facilitation fees, as well as delays at respective quarantine 
checks, and the requirement to offload at Tashkurgan instead at Kashgar, are factors that need 
to be reassessed and addressed to ensure a ‘smooth functioning’ of the economic corridor.157  
 
 
The CPEC and India: Challenge or Opportunity? 
Without a doubt the CPEC has significant strategic implications for India. Conservative 
security analysts in India identify CPEC as a long-term strategy of Beijing not only to 
increase its leverage in Pakistan and to counter US influence but especially to contain Indian 
influence in Afghanistan, Iran and in Central Asian States (CAS).158 Some have argued that 
the build-up of an economic prosperous and socio-politically stable Pakistan would not only 
help to bring security and stability to Xinjiang159 but also strengthen China’s influence in 
South Asia as well as its position towards India, keeping its rival New Delhi busy and focused 
on “local difficulties”.160 Needless to say, India has severe concerns with regards to Chinese 
development projects in Pakistan in general and CPEC in particular. As such, if the corridor 
succeeds and overcomes its challenges, it will be a remarkably valuable strategic asset for 
Beijing.161 
 
Firstly, for a long time now China has been investing significantly in Gilgit-Baltistan and in 
an area known in Pakistan as ‘Azad Kashmir’, both regions are the subject of territorial 
disputes between Pakistan and India. Islamabad claims de facto autonomous control over both 
regions but Gilgit-Baltistan and ‘Azad Kashmir’ are parts of the former princely state of 
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Jammu and Kashmir on which India also lays claim.162 In this context, it is worrying for New 
Delhi that Pakistan is considering to upgrade the constitutional status of Gilgit-Baltistan. Up 
until now, Gilgit-Baltistan was not mentioned by name in the country’s constitution. A 
‘constitutional upgrade’ of this region would determine a significant step towards formally 
absorbing Gilgit-Baltistan as the fifth province of Pakistan. 163 The obvious rationale behind 
such a highly disputable move is to provide CPEC with legal cover, at least from a Pakistani 
and Chinese point of view.  
 
Nevertheless, despite differing claims over the territories, Pakistan and China continue to 
push development projects in the areas and the CPEC and a potential increase in cross-border 
connectivity with India would revive trade and economy in the region.164 Major power 
projects165 aside, the construction of the Karakorum Highway (KKH) benefited much from 
Chinese investment and concrete development activities on the ground. The KKH makes up 
the central piece of the Northern route of the CPEC, passing through Gilgit-Baltistan which 
some Indian analysts protested. 166  It is interesting to note that Beijing abandoned its 
acclaimed neutrality167 on the issue of the disputed area. Xinhua, China’s official media 
outlet, stated the Khunjerab Pass "is a strategic point on the Karakoram Highway, which links 
China's Xinjiang with Pakistan's Gilgit-Baltistan region”. 168  These statements can be 
interpreted siding with with Pakistan169 at the expense of supporting India’s claim over the 
territory. Additionally, the fact that these major projects involve the presence of several 
thousands of Chinese personnel that belong to the construction corps of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) represents another threat to India’s security interests, especially 
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because it looks like Beijing is planning to build-up a military presence in the disputed 
areas.170 
 
Secondly, the prospect that Gwadar may one day become a Chinese naval base and the 
increasing Pakistan-China security cooperation alongside the CPEC rattles the Indian 
government. 171  This also means that CPEC will help Beijing to expand its maritime 
capabilities, particularly in the Indian Ocean Region, increasing its influence and control over 
key maritime trade routes, improving access to energy sources, and massively extending its 
influence in central and south Asia.172 Both New Delhi and Washington feel uneasy about a 
potential Chinese military presence beyond the Indian Ocean and into the waters of the 
Arabian Sea or the Persian Gulf. However, it remains to be seen whether China would want to 
create such a strong presence and risk antagonising the US. China's maritime expansionism is 
fostering fears in New Delhi of a Chinese encirclement of India by a so called ‘string of 
pearls’ or ‘pincer strategy’, understood as a series of strategic naval ports.173  
 
Thirdly, CPEC plans fuel assumptions that the Sino-Pakistani partnership poses a challenge to 
India’s regional standing. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan and China will also increase 
collaboration in strategic and security matters in order to ensure the safety of the 3000 km 
CPEC and related projects.174 The Chinese president Xi Jinping explicitly pointed out that 
“Our [Pakistan-China] cooperation in the security and economic fields reinforce each other, 
and they must be advanced simultaneously”.175 While Islamabad promised to dedicate a 
special army division for this mission176 to protect Chinese workers in Balochistan177, one 
should expect that China will insist on the deployment of its own security forces in  the area. 
This could create further grievances among CPEC critics and could instigate debate about the 
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limits of Pakistan’s sovereignty and independence vis-a-vis Beijing (some refer to Pakistan as 
a Chinese ‘satellite state’).178 Furthermore, as indicated above, Pakistan’s economy is in 
urgent need of capital and foreign investment. US aid is shrinking and another major 
supporting, traditional partner of Islamabad, Saudi Arabia says it “can’t be big as an investor 
as China”.179 While China definitely has the capital handy, several analysts point out that 
Chinese aid does not come with a ‘carte blanche’ and assume there are most likely many 
political strings attached. Keeping in mind the unequal economic relations between China and 
Pakistan, there is the threat that Beijing will take over most of the Pakistani income-
generating sectors, potentially turning the country into an ‘economic colony’.180 All the same, 
"Islamabad has no other option but to increase cooperation with Beijing and do what it 
says."181  
 
However, to deepen the security-military cooperation, Islamabad and Beijing agreed to 
intensify collaboration in defence, counter-terrorism, and space and maritime technology.182 
To live up to this additional agreement, alongside the pledge funds for CPEC, China promised 
the delivery of eight submarines, worth around $4-$5 billion.183 This, of course, enforces 
Indian and US concerns that Gwadar will simply be used for economic purposes but will also 
serve as a major naval base for Chinese and Pakistani Navy. The fact that China helped to 
build-up Pakistan’s capabilities in nuclear weapons and that the new deal includes further 
cooperation in civil nuclear energy,184 adds more fuel to the fire of New Delhi's concerns. In 
addition to this and to further enhance ideological and intellectual cooperation, Beijing and 
Islamabad plan to launch a new joint Pakistan-China think tank. The research centre will 
focus solely on research and development of the CPEC and is called “Research and 
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Development International (RANDI)”.185 As such, RANDI should serve as an ‘Information 
Corridor’ to promote perspectives, data and information for policymakers, students, 
specialists, scholars and companies of both countries”.186 However, observers expect that this 
think tank will gain a lot of  influence, far beyond CPEC matters, and must be seen as a step 
towards the envisaged enhancement of strategic communication and coordination to safeguard 
common Sino-Pakistani interests.187 The fact that Beijing offers to mediate talks with the 
Taliban in Afghanistan indicates another area in which the centre might conduct research.188 
This also indicates a departure from China’s official policy of non-interference in the 
domestic politics of other countries and an indicator that it may shift away from a non-aligned 
foreign policy. Consequently, the extraordinary support for Pakistan, as old friend and ‘quasi-
ally’, can be seen as a critical juncture in China’s bilateral relations. 
 
However, despite these concerns, India could still benefit much from participating in the 
CPEC. This would help to improve Pakistan-India trade but also increases connectivity with 
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Iran and allows India better access to energy- and natural 
resources. In this context, Pakistan and India could work together to revive existing transport 
and economic linkages, which are currently in abeyance. In order to reverse this situation, 
India could connect with the CPEC by establishing trans-border ‘Joint Industrial Zones’ 
and/or mini-corridors. Measures could also include the reopening of additional trade routes 
(Rajasthan-Sindh) to complement the Wagah-Attari route (Punjab). These mini-corridors 
could be connected with existing or proposed infrastructure projects such as the ‘Delhi 
Mumbai Industrial Corridor’189 or the ‘Amritsar Kolkata Industrial Corridor’190. In order to 
increase domestic and regional connectivity the mini-corridor could be linked up with the 
‘Bangladesh China India Myanmar Economic Corridor’ (BCIM-EC)191, the second South 
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Asian arm of OBOR. India’s participation in the CPEC and the establishment of such mini-
corridors would not only increase regional connectivity, but also help solve the problem of 
time-consuming and expensive sea trade192. Furthermore, it would diminish the financial 
losses incurred through smuggling and informal economic networks.  
There are clear signs of growing Sino-Indian economic cooperation and interdependence, as 
demonstrated by President Xi Jinping's 2014 visit to India and by Prime Minister Modi's May 
2015 visit to China.193 India needs foreign investments, especially to implement Mr. Modi’s 
two ambiguous economic programs ‘Digital India’ and ‘Make in India’. Therefore, Chinese 
financing is welcome and Beijing is willing to invest a lot of money in Indian infrastructure, 
pledging up to €17.97 billion for respective projects.194 Subsequently, the OBOR in general 
and the CPEC in particular could help boost Indian trade and development with both China 
and Pakistan. 
 
 
Feasibility of the project: Will the CPEC fulfil its function as an Economic Corridor? 
Overall, the CPEC has the potential to function as a critical juncture in Pakistan’s struggle to 
economic, social and political development and to be a ‘game changer’ for regional 
connectivity, cooperation, and integration. In both countries powerful actors are supporting 
the project. On the Pakistani side, the most significant forces that support CPEC are: the ‘so 
called’ establishment, namely the military, the central government, and the regional elites of 
the country’s most dominant province of Punjab as well as Sindh province (features 
Pakistan’s leading economic hub, the port city of Karachi). Otherwise, an ‘All Party 
Conference (APC)’ agreed to support CPEC and to bring all provinces and major political 
parties ‘on board’ to form a ‘National Consensus’ on the CPEC, at least on paper. On the 
Chinese side, the project is supported by the CCP, the State Council, top banks and leading 
corporations.195 Subsequently one can state that the main political actors on both sides have 
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thrown their weight behind the project; while a careful analysis of facts on the ground raises 
doubts regarding its successful implementation.196 With this in mind, Pakistani and Chinese 
decision-makers are growing more aware of the likely challenges the CPEC could face. In 
order to increase their chances of success, the civilian central government in Islamabad and 
the army top brass in Rawalpindi taking steps to ensure CPEC's implementation. In order to 
reduce the atmosphere of unease in Pakistan’s smaller provinces Balochistan and KPK - who 
are feeling excluded and defrauded of the potential benefits of the Economic Corridor - the 
government set up a Parliamentary Committee in September 2015 to oversee the project. This 
measure is also supposed to remove the impression that CPEC is solely controlled by Prime 
Minister Sharif and his closest associates and may be manipulated in a way that primarily 
enriches the Punjab (Sharif’s home province). 
 
In order to push the construction of the build-up of the western alignment of the CPEC, the 
army decided to deploy the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO)197. The FWO is an active-
duty army administrative (non-combatant) staff corps that mostly employs scientists and 
engineers. Since its establishment in 1966, it carries out major infrastructure projects like 
bridges, roads, tunnels, dams etc. on behalf of the countries’ armed forces or the government; 
one of the most prestigious projects was designing and constructing the Karakoram Highway. 
However, one can state that the deployment of the FWO at the western alignment has been a 
politically inspired decision for two major reasons: firstly, it aims to rebut the accusation that 
Islamabad is only interested in the construction of the Eastern Alignment. Secondly, it looks 
to convince China that CPEC will be implemented in a timely fashion. Nevertheless, it is also 
obvious that the army will reap the vast financial benefits from the CPEC while civilian 
contractors will be excluded from this profitable project.   
 
Furthermore, the implementation and smooth functioning of the CPEC depends heavily on the 
stabilisation of Pakistan’s security environment.198 To improve the security situation the 
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government formed new Special Forces (in Balochistan and Sindh) to protect the construction 
of the corridor, and major military campaigns were conducted to eradicate the 
militant/terrorist threats to peace and stability in the country. Besides the activities of the 
army, all law-enforcing agencies got directions from Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General 
Raheel Sharif to continue nationwide intelligence-based operations (IBOs). The IBOs do not 
exclusively target terrorists, supporters, accomplices and sympathisers but also their 
financiers.199 In this regard, ‘special integrated teams’ -responsible for the implementation of 
IBOs- are deployed to dismantle links between terrorists’ sanctuaries in remote areas and their 
sleeper cells in urban areas.200 
 
In order to increase the project's manageability and to enhance the coordination of security 
and construction activities, the 'so called' Apex Committees were established on two levels of 
governance. The first committee was created at the federal level and includes the Army Chief 
and the Prime Minister as well as other (civilian) senior bureaucrats and top military officials. 
In addition, each province has its own Apex Committee whose members include: the Chief 
Minister, the local Corps Commander, other senior civilian and military officers, and some 
cabinet members.201 However, despite efforts to ensure the implementation of the CPEC, 
Pakistan still faces considerable hurdles. Furthermore, there are several factors indicating that 
some of these measures generate more negative side effects than constructively paving the 
way forward.  
 
First of all, the establishment of the Parliamentary Committee on the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor is meaningless ploy for several reasons. The most significant, immediate 
and seminal decisions regarding the CPEC are already made bilaterally between 
representatives of federal government and Punjab province with the Chinese to agree on the 
early harvest projects. These decisions are carried out mostly in a secretive way as the 
government fails to provide the necessary transparency. It was also unclear how the first 
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bilateral meetings, negotiations and decisions are linked to the immediate implementation of 
CPEC. This exclusivity and secrecy regarding the initial decision-making relates to the ‘joint 
coordination committee of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ which is jointly hosted by 
top government officials from China and Pakistan. Furthermore, a Pakistan-China Economic 
Corridor Secretariat has been formally set up in the Planning Division of the Pakistan 
Ministry of Planning and Development to oversee the economic corridor projects.202 In other 
words, there is very little opportunity for the Parliamentary Committee to influence any 
crucial decision-making in the context of CPEC. Additionally, the Parliamentary Committee 
mostly includes the main beneficiaries of CPEC, namely the central government and the 
larger provinces of Punjab and Sindh. As such, one may conclude the respective 
Parliamentary Committee is a ‘toothless tiger’ rather than a body of decision-making and has 
very little influence on CPEC’s implementation. The fact that it took several months to set up 
the Parliamentary Committee shows the ‘half-heartedness’ of the initiative; also, the Senate 
Committee203 is espousing fruitless criticism rather than acting as an instrument to influence 
the course of the CPEC development.204  
As a result, the decision making process surrounding CPEC is increasingly perceived as 
secretive and exclusive, which in turn supports the claim that the establishment and Punjab 
province (and partly Sindh) will be favoured by the Chinese investment.205 This creates more 
uncertainty and doubts among the people of Balochistan and KPK. The significance of the 
both committees on CPEC, Parliamentary and Senate, is further reduced by the fact that most 
significant decisions regarding the concrete CPEC implementation are done by the military 
dominated Apex Committees and not by the legislative bodies (such as the federal and 
provincial assemblies, cabinets, and committees). 
 
Aside from the problems caused by the marginalisation of the legislative bodies and 
Balochistan and KPK provinces in the CPEC decision-making processes, the challenge of 
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ensuring security remains problematic. First of all, military activity in the region might help to 
reduce the number of terrorist attacks but it creates more anger in the affected areas were 
fighting takes place. Civilian casualties, destruction of properties, and the displacement of 
people generates opposition to the CPEC project. In this context, the expulsion of locals from 
their homes, the land reclamation cases (like Gwadar), the destruction of property as well as 
environmental degradation caused by various CPEC energy and infrastructure projects, lead 
to further tensions. Additionally, the increased military presence in Balochistan is not well 
received as the army is seen as an instrument to suppress local government critics. In sum, at 
the moment it seems that the way in which CPEC is taking shape is further sidelining the 
disadvantaged provinces of Balochistan and KPK as it will predominantly benefit the 
province of Punjab. Consequently, instead of promoting reconciliation among the different 
provinces and ameliorating center-state relations, the corridor could be a source of more 
antagonism and animosity and results in deeper provincial divides. If this trend continues, the 
project will disappoint in a multitude of ways; it will have failed to achieve local ownership 
and missed the opportunity to transform the regional population from ‘rebels’ into CPEC 
‘stakeholders’ and it will be even more difficult to gain the provinces' cooperation in creating 
a “terror-free” Pakistan.  
The government efforts to combat terrorism are gaining significance for the future security 
situation in the region. While - thanks to increased number of military campaigns - the 
number of terrorist attacks have been significantly reduced, Jihadists are still able to conduct 
major assaults like the so called ‘Easter bombing’ in Lahore on March 27. That attack killed 
more than 70 people and exposes the gaps in the Pakistan’s counter-terrorism campaigns. 206 
As such, one must state that “terrorism will remain a threat to Pakistan for the foreseeable 
future” and will have a major impact on CPEC as Jihadi activities will prove to be a threat for 
the smooth and effective functioning of the economic corridor in the long term. If Pakistan is 
unable to end or contain the Jihadi threat, there might not be enough stability to let the 
Chinese projects continue, hampering the possibilities for the CPEC investments to bear fruit. 
There is also a risk that the costs of ensuring security outweigh the potential benefits of the 
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CPEC.207 As such, it might have been “a mistake on China's part to think that by helping 
Pakistan economically, it can reduce the level of extremism in the country”.208 
 
Another hurdle to overcome is the fact that China and Pakistan are currently on very different 
levels of economic development. However, both countries can complement each other 
economically for the following reasons: the Chinese economy faces supply-side pressures for 
certain commodities (especially raw materials) and energy. Here, Pakistan could serve as 
supplier for natural resources (raw materials) and as a transit route for energy. Furthermore, 
China can function as supplier for manufactured goods, technology and investment to address 
the tremendous Pakistani demands in these directions.  
Also, CPEC does not fulfil the requirements that economic corridors need to be based in a 
common culture, religion, language and ecosystem in order to form a sub-region (seen as an 
integrated growth zone). However, Pakistan and China are trying to bridge the gap of a 
‘natural sub-region’ by a tremendous political will by all major actors in both countries. In 
this context, one must mention that many of Beijing’s investments are driven by political 
decisions rather than by economic cost/benefit calculations; Chinese companies moving into 
Pakistan in order to bring the industrial hubs to life are highly professional. As such, Pakistan 
entrepreneurs have to deal with China’s corporate sector that functions -regarding managerial 
decision-making on the individual company level- (largely) autonomously from Beijing. In 
other words, business affairs have to be dealt with in a professional manner; therefore, 
Pakistani companies have to prepare for a highly competitive environment and Islamabad 
needs to spend great effort fulfilling its part of institutional, legal, financial and logistical 
commitments.209 Therefore, it would be a misreading of China’s interests to hail “the corridor 
as proof of the eternal and amazing friendship between China and Pakistan”.210  
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Chinese (as well as other foreign) companies will not risk their investment and the lives of 
their employees211 if Pakistan is unable to ensure a stable and secure environment free from 
bureaucratic hurdles and without resource shortages.  
 
Finally, one must analyse CPEC in the context of a tense civil-military relationship within the 
country. At the moment Pakistan is further entrenching a formal role for the Pakistan Armed 
Forces in the country’s political system at the expense of democratic transition. More 
concretely, civil decision-making powers will be weakened even further.212 As such, any real 
control of the military will likely be impossible as several factors indicate the decay of 
civilian governance on the central and provincial level. 
First of all, the challenge to ensure security for the CPEC development had the most 
significant impact on the civil-military relations. For example, new armed forces in 
Balochistan and Sindh, dedicated solely to protect CPEC, were formed without any input 
from the civilian leadership. Even more remarkable is the increasing autonomy of the army in 
internal security, which is evident in it's unilateral decision to launch the Zarb-e-Azb 
operation213 in the summer of 2014.214 Decisions to extent the duration as well as the 
geographical expansion of the operations in the Zarb-e-Azb anti-terrorism campaign were 
also made by the armed forces themselves.215 The operation initially focused on the border 
areas to with, but the army declared the operation would include the whole territory of 
Pakistan.216 In this context, a major (official) goal of the country’s security circles is to link 
CPEC with the aim to achieve a ‘terror free Pakistan’. The commitment -irrespective of the 
costs- shows in Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif’s statement: "We 
[Pakistan’s security forces] will not stop unless we achieve our end objective of a terror-free 
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Pakistan”217. Another case of autonomous decision-making by the army is the Karachi 
security operation218, which resembles the Zarb-e-Azb operation. In this case the decision to 
carry out decisive measures against terrorists laid in the hands of the military and the rangers 
(a paramilitary force headed by the army) themselves.219 The military briefed the civilian 
government only after the decisions were made.  
 
Another example of the increasing power of the military would be the establishment of the 
Apex Committees at the federal and provincial levels, leading to the reduction of decision-
making powers of the executive while escaping parliamentary oversight by the national and 
provincial assemblies respectively. In other words, most of the important decisions related to 
CPEC are made by a military-bureaucratic hybrid structure. Officially, the establishment of 
the Apex committees aims to enhance civil-military interaction to improve the security 
situation in general and to counter terrorism in particular and the initial tasks of the Apex 
committees were to coordinate security and to implement the National Action Plan220 (drafted 
jointly by the government, parliament and army). 221  However, over time the Apex 
Committees have become more important decision-making bodies than the federal and 
provincial cabinets as cabinets meet less frequently in comparison with the Apex 
Committees.222 It is well known that the Pakistani Army plays a dominant role in politics ever 
since the formation of the country, it exerts its influence directly through military coup and 
martial law or indirectly by informally influencing civilian decision makers to act in the 
interest of the military. However, the new administrative set-up of Apex Committees formally 
establishes the military's influence as an actor involved in governance, political, 
administrative management and strengthens its positions with regards to every aspect of the 
decision making process relating to CPEC and beyond.223  
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This phenomenon started with the enactment of 21st constitutional amendment which let to 
new institutional arrangements such as granting armed forces special powers and the 
establishment of military courts. Today, the military possesses the strongest formally 
institutionalized role in the country’s political system since its formation. Against this 
backdrop, one must state that the military was not only able to extend its influence at the 
expense of all three branches of government (executive, legislative and judiciary), but also 
managed to build-up a ‘quasi-parallel structure of governance’. As a result, the military does 
indirectly rule the country, eliminating any need for a direct take-over (coup d’état).   
 
In this context it is most worrisome that Pakistani politicians, academia, media and large parts 
of society grant the country’s armed forces an unquestioned ‘carte blanche’ in all their 
activities for the sake of a successful implementation of the CPEC. Against this backdrop one 
must state that the CPEC is under control of the military. This could have negative 
ramifications for India-Pakistan relations and a potential participation of New Delhi in the 
project; especially when Pakistan’s army and intelligence services have the ability to veto 
Pakistan-India rapprochement. The latest terrorist attacks in India carried out by a Pakistan 
based terrorist groups are a premonition of an increasingly somber future for New Delhi and 
Islamabad cooperation. 
 
In sum, the CPEC will only fulfil its function as an economic corridor under following 
conditions: All three corridors must be established to include all provinces. While people will 
continue to discuss the various advantages and disadvantages of certain routes, CPEC can 
unfold extraordinary benefits when it gets implemented as a nation-wide network connecting 
and incorporating as many urban and rural areas as possible, and including Quetta 
(Balochistan) and Peshawar (KPK). The creation of necessary links between nodes, meaning 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) and industrial areas, must be ensured in line with Chinese 
requirements. Subsequently, these SEZ’s must be equipped with all basic facilities like 
communication, infrastructural connectivity, energy, and provide resources for 
manufacturing. Furthermore, the government must guarantee that Pakistan workforce are 
included in the CPEC projects' deployment schemes. Therefore, it has to make sure that the 
country is able to improve is educational system and increases its ability to offer skilled 
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labour. The presence of many Islamic schools (Madrasas) with a religious orientated 
curriculum across the country does not improve know-how and does not provide a qualified 
work force to match Chinese demands. However, it is also essential that Chinese companies 
are “willing” to employ Pakistani workforce instead of solely relying on its own citizens. In 
this context, it will also be important that the SEZ’s and industrial areas are open for Pakistani 
entrepreneurs and not only serve as platforms to outsource Chinese manufacturing and 
increase proximity to resources and export markets. As such, it will be interesting to observe 
how Pakistani firms perform under the new conditions and if they are able to compete with 
the Chinese companies. Up until now, it remains unclear how the CPEC “would affect trade 
patterns between Pakistan and China; would it mean even more imports from the latter one or 
the other way around?”224. Taking into account the asymmetric economic relations between 
both countries, Pakistan runs the risk that an improved connectivity with China will lead to a 
rise in imports. 225  Another crucial consideration would be to what extent the various 
economic sectors in Pakistan are benefiting from spill-over effects of the improvements in 
infrastructure and energy situation. 
 
Furthermore, Islamabad must work towards national consensus and harmony to gain trust and 
full support of the people, especially in the provinces that find they are being neglected. This 
is not only a necessary condition for peace and stability but also a severe demand by Beijing. 
In order to fulfil the pre-requisite, Islamabad has to make sure that all provinces get integrated 
in the CPEC decision-making process as soon as possible. Furthermore, all decisions 
regarding implementation and further planning have to be clear and transparent. This includes 
the introduction of a fair distribution mechanism of CPEC revenues between the central 
government and the provinces as well as among the provinces, a strict enforcement of 
payment morale of Pakistani companies, institutions, and private persons regarding 
outstanding and future electricity debts. Otherwise, there will never be a sustainable solution 
for the disastrous electricity shortages; the introduction of fiscal justice and fair taxation. In 
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other words, there must be a coherent tax system to generate revenues for further Pakistani 
investments within the CPEC framework. 
 
Finally, an improvement and/or establishment of a civilian control and oversight mechanism 
is sorely needed. To achieve this the Apex Committees should be immediately dissolved and 
oversight by national and provincial assemblies and respective cabinets must be restored. If 
this is impossible because of the complexity of the issue as well as a lack of capacities and 
capabilities226 specialised institutions/bodies must be established under direct (sole) control of 
the civilian (legislative and executive) institutions. It will be essential for the country’s 
democratic trajectory that any military representation is removed from the decision-making 
process and the military should report transparently on the status of security and ongoing 
activities regarding CPEC and beyond. If such measures are not successfully carried out, the 
CPEC will further entrench the military in the country’s politics and will likely stifle any 
future attempt to bring Pakistan back on the democratic reform track. 
 
 
Final Thoughts - Impact of CPEC on regionalisation 
Insofar as CPEC may have positive impacts on regionalisation depends on its ability to 
increase regional connectivity as much as possible. Therefore, it is most important that the 
CPEC will be integrated in transport, energy and trade infrastructure networks beyond the 
Pakistan-China nexus. As CPEC is linked with Kashgar and its growing special economic 
zone227, a successful entrenchment into the northern networks is ensured, connecting the 
CPEC with Central Asian States, Russia and Europe.228 However, it will be most important 
that Pakistan includes its neighbours as they would greatly benefit from this project if it 
succeeds. 229  Subsequently, Pakistan should open up the CPEC to the West (Iran and 
Afghanistan) and to the East (India); only then can it make a significant impact on regional 
connectivity and may become a game changer for regional cooperation in South Asia.  
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For any real change to occur, a normalisation of Pakistan-India relations and a constructive 
Pakistan-Iran relationship are essential preconditions. Furthermore, a fundamental 
reassessment of Pakistan’s predominantly-security based approach towards Afghanistan and 
India is needed.230 However, this requires a decisive change in the mind-set of regional 
decision-makers, especially in Islamabad and New Delhi; the tensions in the India-Pakistan 
relationship continue to obstruct any noteworthy regional collaboration. Regarding 
Afghanistan, Pakistan must finally drop the vision of ‘strategic depth’231 and/or similar 
notions and adopt a nonpartisan policy approach towards Afghanistan’s internal affairs.232 
Therefore, Pakistan should redefine its regional profile and normalize economic and 
diplomatic relations with its neighbours.233 With the formulation of its ‘Vision 2025’234, 
Islamabad took the first step, at least in theory; however, Pakistan must also develop a foreign 
policy free from ideological parameters that will allow rational behaviour in its bilateral 
relations. More concretely, Pakistan needs the put greater emphasis on trade and economic 
cooperation rather than putting the focus on security.235 Until now, the country’s military and 
intelligence services, as well as some Islamic fundamentalist elements, undermine any 
sustainable rapprochement between Islamabad, New Delhi and Kabul. On this matter China 
sides with Pakistan on several issues (for example in the territorial dispute over Gilgit-
Baltistan), nevertheless it does not want deepen involvement in India-Pakistan disputes.236 As 
such, Beijing could play an essential role as interlocutor and make it clear “that the proposal 
to open access to the economic corridor for India has credible commitment at the highest 
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levels in China”237. Beijing is most likely the only actor that could encourage a change in 
Pakistan’s mindset. Only then can regional connectivity be improved and can Pakistan, China 
and the whole extended region enjoy maximum benefits from the economic corridor.  
 
In order to work towards sustainable regional cooperation, peace and stability, the integration 
of Afghanistan into the CPEC as well as other economic corridors must be ensured. 
Therefore, China has vested interests in a stable Afghanistan that is no longer under control of 
the Taliban, “who it believes lends sanctuary to the Muslim Uighur separatist groups in the 
autonomous western region of Xinjiang”.238 This raises the questions of how much influence 
China has on Pakistan’s security sector and whether it may be able to extend its influence 
over Afghan Taliban. And, if this is the case, how far they will still comply with the Pakistani 
forces. While it may be tempting to assume Chinese influence in this matter, assessing the 
genesis of foreign influence in Afghanistan shows that Pakistan and China have differing 
priorities: Beijing primary interest is peace and stability, while Islamabad looks to exercise 
influence and to keep its rival India out of.239 In this context, it is interesting to note that in the 
past “China used to outsource its Afghanistan policy to Pakistan but is now taking a far more 
active role in the planning for the aftermath of the West's drawdown”.240 However, Beijing 
“expects Pakistan to take Chinese concerns into account”.241 This could help to improve 
relations between Kabul and Islamabad and may boost Pakistan-Afghanistan economic 
cooperation. 
 
In the wake of the new US-Iran nuclear deal and subsequent removal of sanctions, Iran’s 
newly reestablished position in international relations will open up new opportunities for 
cooperation with Pakistan. A successful eastward orientation would not only help deepen 
regional cooperation but offers tremendous opportunities for the CPEC in general and the 
Western alignment of the economic corridor in particular. The cooperation in energy and 
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trade would benefit much from a rapprochement between Islamabad and Tehran. 
Furthermore, the construction of an Iran-Pakistan pipeline would create another avenue of 
potential cooperation. No doubt that any rapprochement has to take both 'Pakistan's special 
relations with Saudi Arabia' and subsequently 'Riyadh’s sentiments towards Tehran' into 
account. Riyadh and Islamabad share a long history of cooperation on defence and security, 
and Saudi Arabia has often helped Pakistanis with precarious financial situations. 242 
Nevertheless, the CPEC may initiate a gradual shift in Pakistan's regional outlook and its 
relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. On the one hand, Pakistan considers Iran a potential 
partner to help it overcome its dire energy needs, but on the other hand it does not want to 
offend Saudi Arabia by getting too close to Tehran.243 This will be a difficult balancing act for 
Islamabad due to the growing Saudi-Iranian hostility in the Middle East. For example, Saudi 
Arabia was displeased that Pakistan's parliament voted against joining the Saudi-led attacks 
(Operation Decisive Storm) against Iranian supported Houthi rebels in Yemen.244 Against this 
backdrop, Pakistan will most likely approach the situation with great caution, to not further 
alienate Saudi Arabia.  
 
However, the difficult task of balancing its relations with Tehran and Riyadh is only one 
challenge in the context of the CPEC. At this time, it is unclear whether Iran will turn out to 
be a competitor or an ally. As indicated above, the Chinese government is concerned with the 
ongoing political conflicts that obstruct CPEC's implementation, security problems, delays 
and more. Tehran may offer an alternative economic partnership and corridor; Iran’s main 
argument is that it has the functional port Chabahar, only 36 km from Gwadar that lies in a 
remote and restive area.245 In contrast to Gwadar246, Chabahar is well connected with the 
country’s infrastructure and Iran can guarantee the security of Chinese investments and its 
workers. In this context it is interesting to mention that China offered to invest $51 billion in 
Iran, which is more than it offers Pakistan to implement the CPEC. In sum, there is the 
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imminent threat that a potential Iran-China Corridor turns into competition for the CPEC. 
However, taking Pakistan’s ‘strategic location’247 (which is the country’s major asset) and 
Chinese interests into account, one can state that an ‘Iran option’ will merely be an additional 
option for Beijing and is unlikely to substitute CPEC. 
 
In conclusion, the CPEC must be designed as an entity with an inclusive character, open to all 
actors willing to participate in a constructive manner. Therefore, Pakistan’s government needs 
to work towards a national consensus and harmony. In order to do so, it has to stop side-lining 
and suppressing the interests of the smaller provinces, namely Balochistan and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), it has to put a stop to provincial rivalries and introduce an all-inclusive 
and transparent decision-making process. It must also establish mechanisms that allow for the 
fair distribution of the profits generated by CPEC and related projects among the provinces. 
In other words, the federal government must address the grievances of the local people, 
especially in Balochistan. Its current policy of zero tolerance and crushing military response 
to any opposition in Balochistan will escalate the situation248 and increase the risks for 
Chinese workers and projects in the provinces; the persistent attacks on Chinese workforces 
can be seen as proof of this hypothesis. In this context, Islamabad “should keep in mind that 
development does not bring peace, rather it is peace that brings development.”249 The dream 
of a fully functional Gwadar port, which could turn the province into an important energy 
conduit in the region, can only come true if peace and stability return to Balochistan.250 In this 
context, Gilgit-Baltistan serves also as an important reference. In that case, Islamabad 
expected that an improvement of the socio-economic conditions would positively impact 
peace and reconciliation in the conflict driven Gilgit-Baltistan. However, the construction of 
the Karakoram Highway Tensions has failed resolve tensions between Shia and Sunni 
communities. To the contrary, the tensions have only increased.251 
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On the international level, Pakistan needs a fundamental reassessment of its foreign policy to 
be able to enter in a constructive relationship with its neighbours. As long as Islamabad gives 
the impression to be unreliable, it will be unable to obtain their cooperation on CPEC. On the 
other hand, India also urgently needs to debate and proclaim its stance vis-a-vis CPEC, any 
discourse should be based on a rational evaluation of policy options, free from emotional 
arguments. This will be not easy, considering the fact that New Delhi fears that participation 
in the CPEC might lead to a de-facto legitimisation of Islamabad’s claims over disputed 
territory, making the situation even more complicated for India. 
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